We are sharing part three of the report, to introduce some of the main engagement opportunities that were discussed.

January 22 – Today’s Questions:

How should Armenians engage with Turkey?

Engagement with Turkey

Three sets of questions need to be addressed in this matter. First, why do Armenians want to engage with Turkey? Second, who will engage? And third, how is it to be done? The “why” question has three interlinked answers, which are also an indication of the core issues to engage on:

a. To end the denial of the Armenian Genocide by Turkish state and society, and to finally obtain some justice for the descendants of the victims, and possible reparations. This also entails preserving  and reinventing the Armenian patrimony in Turkey, restoring monuments and buildings for the public good.

b. For the future prosperity of Armenia, the understanding being that with an open Armenian-Turkish border trade will flow and the economy will grow. Even though Turkey has tied the opening of the border with the conflict over NK, if the border does open, it might have a positive impact on negotiations with Azerbaijan.

c. The democratisation of Turkey is in the interest of Armenians, particularly for the well-being of the Armenian minority in Turkey.

Who should engage has some obvious answers: the governments of Armenia and Turkey, directly with each other. But Armenian-Turkish relations are not confined to governments. Individual engagement from Armenia and the diaspora is important too, as are the contacts of civil society organisations (NGOs) and academic institutions. To date, these have been instrumental in establishing contact between the two peoples, and enhancing the spaces of understanding. Diasporabased Armenian organisations have a role to play as well, although they have been lagging in their presence in Turkey. Crucially, the Armenian community of Turkey is a major actor, and interlocutor, in this relationship. Finally, engagement with local municipalities in the Kurdish region has borne some fruit in the past several years and can be augmented.

“How to engage” has many possibilities, but also many snares. Armenians need to be bold, knocking on doors and building trust, and yet exercise much caution so that they are not used for propaganda purposes or naively outstrategised. They must also see some good faith and confidence building measures from the government in Ankara. Some possible areas of engagement include the following ten ideas. To begin with, given the dearth of knowledge about Turkey in Armenia and in the diaspora, initiatives are needed to learn about Turkey. Academic visits, policy oriented research projects, publications, are all important mechanisms of engagement at this stage. Second, Armenians can be involved in patrimony preservation projects, bringing their knowledge of Armenian culture to its conservation. Third, working with individuals with Armenian heritage, Armenians can be instrumental in educating Turkish citizens, particularly in the East, about the Armenian past of the region and of their families (this is particularly poignant in the face of a newly emerging identity, that of Islamised descendants of Genocide survivors in Anatolia). Fourth, civil society to civil society engagement should expand, particularly in the domain of respectful dialogue. This will, importantly, introduce diasporan agency into the equation. Fifth, economic cooperation between businessmen and the private sector is another area of engagement (which is more likely if there are commercial interests involved). Sixth, organisational cooperation with Kurdish municipalities and establishments (which already takes place to some degree) is an effective way of establishing networks and undertaking joint projects. Seventh, visiting Turkey, as vocal and visibly engaged Armenians, is a form of engagement as well (i.e. “heritage tourism”). Eight, making Armenian collective memory available through publications, exhibitions, films, translations and the like is an important educational tool. Ninth, the possible citizenship issue – i.e. granting citizenship to descendants of Genocide survivors can be a point of discussion with the government. And tenth, using the Turkish legal system to get back confiscated properties is a form of legal engagement which can be effective in some instances.

Engagement with Armenia’s Other Neighbours

Armenia and Armenians do have some choices in their engagement with other neighbours. What follows are certain points and questions that ought to be considered as Armenians look ahead into the next several decades. These points are for discussion and would, hopefully, feed into policy formulation by various institutions.

Azerbaijan

In Scenario 3 above, the possibility of war erupting between Armenia and Azerbaijan was mentioned. As a party to the conflict, Armenia does have certain choices and can influence outcomes pertaining to its relationship with Azerbaijan. The following questions ought to help with policy formulation:

a. First and foremost is the fundamental question, is peace essential for the development of Armenia and Karabakh? If so, what are the minimum requirements to achieve peace?

b. Should the Armenian government be encouraged to negotiate?

c. What measures can be taken to mitigate the discourse of hatred, or of perpetual conflict?

d. Should non-government organisations take a proactive role in peacebuilding, and encourage the will to negotiate? What other role, if any, should civil society organisations assume?

e. Can informal and confidential channels of communication be opened? Should they be encouraged?

Seminar participants did not provide answers to these questions, but posed them to frame future discussions. There was consensus, however, on the point that Armenians should not rely on outsiders to resolve the conflict.

Georgia

Given that Armenia and Georgia have different inclinations in terms of foreign policy – the first is more EU-focused whereas the latter is part of the Eurasian Union – it is important to analyse the long-term implications and impact of this divergence on Armenia. Based on such analysis, Armenia can develop policies to reduce its dependence on Russia and have a more balanced economy. Part of this dynamic is the scenario whereby Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey integrate further economically, leaving out Armenia. Armenia does have the ability to pursue policies so as not to be excluded from regional trade networks. There are more specific issues to contend with. These include:

a. Nuance in dealing with the Javakheti region of Georgia which is populated by Armenians.

b. Possible tensions over Armenian churches in Georgia in the face of attempts by the Georgians to take over some properties.

Armenia cannot afford to have its relations with Georgia deteriorate, and to date the relationship has been well managed. It is important for Armenians to see Georgia as part of the solution to its problems and not as another problem.

Russia

Armenia’s engagement with Russia remains steady, and is at multiple levels: political, security, economic and social. Many of these issues were discussed previously and there is no need to repeat them here. Only two further points need to be added in terms of Armenian policy development:

a. The importance of engaging with Russia on the large Armenian diaspora in that country, while also engaging directly with that diaspora to help it organise and mobilise to maintain its identity.

b. Related to the first point is the crucial need to enhance our knowledge of that diaspora through serious research. It is seriously understudied.

Iran

Even though Armenia’s relations with Iran were not discussed at any length, certain points were made in passing which have relevance to foreign policy development:

a. The prospects of improved relations between Iran and the United States. How can Armenia benefit from this?

b. Actions Yerevan could take so that Iran becomes a significant source of energy for Armenia.

c. Constantly monitoring Russia-Iran and Azerbaijan-Iran relations, and adapting Armenia’s policies accordingly while maintaining good relations with Iran.

Write to us on [email protected] and join the discussions online by following our social media partners.

Please use the official hashtag #Armenians2115